In Michigan, consent is not an element of criminal sexual conduct that prosecutors are required to disprove beyond a reasonable doubt. Rather, consent is an affirmative defense available for defendants who are charged with committing criminal sexual conduct under some of the provided-for circumstances. For example, consent may be used to negate the elements of ‘force or coercion’ under MCL 750.520b(1)(d)(ii); however, it is not available for criminal sexual conduct occurring “under circumstances involving the commission of any other felony” as provided in MCL 750.520b(1)(c) . Michigan’s standard criminal jury instructions state that
[a] person consents to a sexual act by agreeing to it freely and willingly, without being forced or coerced. It is not necessary to show that the complainant resisted the defendant to prove that this crime was committed. Nor is it necessary to show that complainant did anything to lessen the damage to him/herself.
Therefore, consent is likely to be defined as a free and willing agreement to engage in a sexual act, provided without force or coercion, between individuals who are of sufficient age and are not mentally incapable, mentally disabled, mentally incapacitated or physically helpless.
 People v. Stull, 127 Mich. App. 14, 19-20; 338 N.W.2d 403 (1983).
Note: in regards to criminal sexual conduct crimes, consent is not defined within statutory law.
 People v. Waltonen, 272 Mich. App. 678; 728 N.W.2d 887-88 (2007).
 Mich. CJI2d 20.27(1)-(2) (see attached documents for further delineation of factors a jury may consider when determining whether consent or force or coercion is present); see People v. Khan, 80 Mich. App. 605, 619, fn. 5; 264 N.W.2d 360 (1978) (“Although the statute is silent on the defense of consent, we believe it impliedly comprehends that a willing, noncoerced act of sexual intimacy or intercourse between persons of sufficient age who are neither “mentally defective”, “mentally incapacitated”, nor “physically helpless” is not criminal sexual conduct.”)(internal citations omitted) and People v. Hale, 142 Mich. App. 451, 452; 370 N.W.2d 382 (1985) (upholding a trial court’s definition of consent as a “willing act of sexual intimacy or intercourse between persons of sufficient age who are neither mentally defective, mentally incapacitated nor physically helpless is not criminal sexual conduct”).